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Abstract 
‘Does EU regulation hinder or stimulate innovation’ is a frequently heard query in the EU, but 
there is little systematic analytical literature on the issue. Fragmented evidence or anecdotes 
dominate debates among EU regulatory decision-makers and in European business, insofar as 
there is a genuine debate at all. This CEPS Special Report focuses on the multi-faceted, 
ambiguous and complex relationship between (EU) regulation and innovation in the economy, 
and discusses the innovation-enhancing potential of certain regulatory approaches as well as 
factors that tend to reduce incentives to innovate. We adopt an 'ecosystem' approach to both 
regulation and innovation and study the interactions between the two ecosystems. This 
general analysis and survey are complemented by seven case studies of EU regulation 
enabling and disabling innovation, two horizontal and five sectoral ones. The case studies are 
preceded by a broader contextual analysis of trends in EU regulation over the last three 
decades. These trends show the significant transformation of the nature as well as 
improvement of the quality of EU regulation, largely in the deepened internal market, which 
tend to have a favourable and lasting effect on the rate of innovation in the EU (other things 
being equal).  
Our findings include the following: Regulation can at times be a powerful stimulus to 
innovation. EU regulation matters at all stages of the innovation process. Different types of 
regulation can be identified in terms of innovation impact: general or horizontal, innovation-
specific and sector-specific regulation. More prescriptive regulation tends to hamper 
innovative activity, whereas the more flexible EU regulation is, the better innovation can be 
stimulated. Lower compliance and red-tape burdens have a positive effect on innovation. 
We recommend incorporating a specific test on innovation impacts in the ex-ante impact 
assessment of EU legislation as well as in ex-post evaluation. There is ample potential for 
fostering innovation by reviewing the EU regulatory acquis. 
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Introduction  
As recalled on several occasions by the European Commission and other EU institutions, the 
EU’s innovation performance has been (on average) rather sluggish over the past two 
decades.1 The European Commissioner for research and innovation, Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, 
has spoken of an “innovation emergency”, the causes of which are often described as related 
to the lack of a suitable “ecosystem”, in which the economic, social, institutional and 
regulatory factors are conducive to entrepreneurship.2 For at least two decades, the EU has 
been searching for better and new ways to improve and intensify innovation. It is remarkable 
that the most important day-to-day activity of the EU – regulation in the framework of the 
internal market and in common policies – and its effects on innovation have hardly been 
addressed in a systematic manner. The present CEPS Special Report attempts to begin to fill 
this major deficit. We ask the question whether EU regulation hinders or stimulates innovation 
in the EU. Of course, the ultimate purpose of the analysis is to help EU policy-makers, 
legislators and stakeholders to design EU regulation in such a way as to stimulate and not 
hinder innovation. 
There is some awareness of the regulation and innovation issue, more often than not in the 
form of anecdotes or complaints from business. Recently, in a stocktaking exercise on the 
impact of the Innovation Union initiative in its first four years (2010-2014), the European 
Commission has observed that the initiative “is succeeding in building momentum around 
innovation, mobilising stakeholders and mainstreaming innovation in key European, national 
and regional policies”.3 The Commission also observed that the eco-system for innovation has 
been greatly improved by putting in place key single market measures, but also that 
“inconsistencies of rules and practices remain and are hampering the development of high 
growth innovative firms, which often find it too burdensome and risky to operate on other 
European markets”, with obvious shortcomings for the diffusion of innovative products and 
                                                   
* Jacques Pelkmans is Senior Fellow at CEPS in Brussels and Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges. 
Andrea Renda is Senior Fellow at CEPS and Senior Lecturer at LUISS Guido Carli in Rome.  
1 See the Innovation Union Scoreboard. The Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS) has provided a 
comparative assessment of the innovation performance of the EU27 Member States since 2000. IUS 
includes a selection of indicators, which are proxies of innovation performance, and provides a basis for 
the analysis of improvements in performance over time. The IUS draws on statistics from various 
sources, such as the Community Innovation Survey, and groups indicators into ‘enablers’, ‘firm 
activities’ and ‘outputs’. See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/ policy/innovation-
scoreboard/index_en.htm.  
2 See Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, “From Innovation Emergency to Economic Growth”, Innovation 
Lecture, The Hague, 26 March 2012. European Commission - SPEECH/12/226. 
3 See the State of the Innovation Union Report 2014 (European Commission, 2014b). 
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services. Also, skills shortage and mismatch are still significant, in particular for what the 
Commission defines as ‘21st century skills’ for creativity and entrepreneurial spirit.  
Today, it is increasingly acknowledged in the literature that public policy can affect innovation 
incentives in many more ways than simply relying on innovation policy tools tout court. 
However, little systematic attention seems to have been paid, so far, to the interaction between 
EU regulation and innovation in the Union. The present study attempts to do exactly that, 
within the constraints of the limited space available. However, as we shall show, whilst a more 
general economic perspective on the interaction between EU regulation and innovation in the 
EU is indispensable, and the development of a framework of analysis is most useful, it is 
equally important to appreciate the often highly specific relationship between the two in 
different markets and/or with distinct types of regulation. This is so because both innovation 
and ‘regulation’ are generic terms for what are in fact numerous complex and diverse 
activities, both privately and publicly.  
Section 1 below defines both innovation and regulation and maps the interactions between the 
two in a comprehensive manner, also based on the findings of the economic literature in this 
field. Section 2 then discusses the potential obstacles and incentives created by EU regulation 
to innovation. Section 3 discusses a number of case studies in which regulation has 
significantly affected innovation. Section 4 concludes by putting forward a number of policy 
recommendations.  
1. Innovation and regulation: Connecting the dots 
In this section we first briefly define innovation and regulation, and then discuss the phases of 
the innovation process that are affected by regulation, and more specifically by EU regulation.  
1.1 Innovation: definition, main types and phases  
Based on previous literature, Granieri and Renda (2012) give the following definition: (a) the 
creation of new (or the efficient reallocation of existing) resources (b) which contribute to 
progress. The first, ontological, element of innovation is approached in the broadest possible 
sense, leaving space for user-generated innovation, automated innovation, industrial R&D 
projects, public investment, etc. The second, teleological, element simply states that a new 
product is to be considered innovation only to the extent that it contributes to social welfare 
in the long run, without depriving society of resources that could have been more usefully 
allocated elsewhere. In a nutshell, innovation’s main features are allocative efficiency and 
progress. 
Innovation may well occur in market processes and products but also outside the marketplace, 
including among end users and without any need for an R&D process. The OECD (2005) 
distinguishes between four types of innovation: product innovation, process innovation, 
marketing innovation and organisational innovation. Another very important distinction in 
the economic literature is that between disruptive (or “radical”) and incremental (or “follow-
on”) innovation. The latter occurs when firms make relatively minor improvements to existing 
products and processes, improving pre-existing attributes in order to meet the minimum 
standards for compliance; to the contrary, radical or disruptive innovation replaces existing 
products or processes, and is typically more risky, but also more beneficial when it produces 
new products or processes.  
The (industrial) innovation process comprises the chain beginning with applied R&D, 
prototyping and development, and commercialisation. 
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1.2 Regulation: Definition and main features 
As explained in the previous section, regulation is one of the activities that governments can 
engage in and which can exert a profound impact on the level and direction of innovation, 
both in specific sectors and in the economy as a whole. Below, we explain the main 
precondition for regulation – the existence of a market or a regulatory failure – and then briefly 
introduce the various phases of the life of a rule, focusing specifically on EU rules.  
The most typical precondition for regulation, which becomes its main objective, is the existence 
of situations in which market forces, by themselves, do not lead to a socially optimal result. 
These cases are termed “market failures” in economics, and include cases of significant market 
power (and abuse thereof), public goods, externalities, and asymmetric or incomplete 
information.  
Market failures are, of course, not the only situations that lead governments to regulate. 
Among the other possible conditions that trigger regulatory interventions, we include 
regulatory failures, i.e. when existing rules produce suboptimal outcomes; equity/fairness 
reasons (when the objective of regulation departs from that of efficiency to embrace more 
socially or environmentally relevant objectives); and long-term policy goals such as the need 
to complete the Internal Market or to achieve Europe 2020 goals.  
We distinguish between:4 
 The Agenda-Setting phase of regulation: during this phase, the main preparatory 
documents (at EU level, Green Paper, White Paper, Communications) are prepared and 
adopted. This can include ‘umbrella’ regulations, e.g. framework regulations that are 
binding but still require the adoption of further implementation measures.  
 The legislation phase entails the decision-making and adoption of secondary legislation 
measures, in the form of (at EU level) specific directives or regulations, or delegated acts. 
This phase can typically imply the setting of targets or requirements or caps, which 
might be kept fixed or changed throughout the lifespan of the legal rules. In the case of 
directives, these have to be transposed into national laws and implemented. In some 
cases, depending on the type of regulatory alternative chosen (see below), 
implementation measures might have to be adopted by private organisations in the 
execution of a co-regulatory arrangement.  
 The compliance phase is not a regulatory phase, but rather refers to the set of actions 
and behaviour that have to be put in place by targeted stakeholders when having to 
comply with a specific set of rules. As will be illustrated below, different types of 
regulatory interventions can have a very significant impact on innovation when it comes 
to compliance.  
 The enforcement phase refers to the monitoring of compliance with the rules. It most 
often entails the involvement of national or local administrations, which perform 
inspections and might impose sanctions for non-compliance. Also, this phase can be 
delegated to specific agencies or even private parties depending on the type of 
regulatory approach chosen.  
                                                   
4 We rely on a simple conceptualisation of the main phases of EU legislation, which partly echoes the 
one used by the European Commission, as well as the “ANIME” framework developed (mostly for 
private regulation) by Abbott and Snidal (2009). 
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1.2.1 Main types of regulatory intervention 
Regulation can respond to market failures and other policy problems in different ways. The 
practice of ex ante impact assessment of regulation in the European Commission has led, over 
time, to a definition of a number of “types” of regulatory intervention. For the purposes of this 
paper, we adopt here a simplified taxonomy. 
 Regulation through information. This is a very ‘light-touch’ form of regulation, which 
aims at affecting consumer and firm behaviour by increasing the amount of information 
available on the marketplace.  
 Self-regulation. This covers a large number of practices, common rules, codes of 
conduct and voluntary agreements by which economic actors, social players, NGOs and 
organised groups establish themselves voluntarily to regulate and organise their 
activities. Self-regulation can provide greater speed, responsiveness and flexibility as it 
can be established and altered more quickly than legislation; however, it needs to be 
open and transparent as it may provide an opportunity for collusive arrangements.5  
 Co-regulation is “a mechanism in which a Community legislative act entrusts the 
attainment of the objectives defined by the legislator to parties which are recognized in 
the field (such as economic operators, the social partners, non-governmental 
organizations, or associations)”.6 Co-regulation combines the advantages of the binding 
nature of legislation with a flexible self-regulatory approach to implementation that 
encourages innovation and draws on the experience of the parties concerned. A 
drawback is the need to set up monitoring arrangements. 
 Standardisation. Another approach that can serve as an alternative to legislation, or 
partially replace detailed regulation, is the reference to European Standards. This, at the 
EU level, requires the involvement of the European Standards Organisations CEN, 
CELENEC and ETSI. More precisely, the Commission may give mandates to ESOs to 
write standards, to be officially recognised by the EU as fulfilling particular (health, 
safety, environmental) objectives in EU regulation. This creates much greater certainty 
for companies as all they have to do is comply with such (performance) standards, for 
having an ensured access to the entire internal market. However, such standards are 
invariably voluntary, leaving (other) innovative options open. ESOs should also be 
consulted if a proposed policy option refers to European Standards, and might require 
changes in any of them. 
 Market-based instruments influence the behaviour of market players by providing 
(negative/positive) monetary incentives or by guaranteeing some basic rules of the 
game. Possible alternative types are: i) marketable offsets, which allow producers to 
negotiate with each other and agents to ensure overall compliance, without this being 
necessarily enforced on all producers at the same level; ii) marketable permits; iii) taxes 
or charges; iv) property and liability rules; and iv) limits to price and/or quantity 
(licences, quotas, etc.). 
 Prescriptive regulatory actions. These entail the incorporation of mandatory 
requirements into legislation (regulations, directives or decisions). The European 
Commission Impact Assessment guidelines distinguish between: 
o Traditional ‘command and control’ policies. These specify the use of certain practices, 
technologies, or designs. The advantage is relative ease of monitoring and 
                                                   
5 Cafaggi and Renda (2011); and Cafaggi, Renda and Schmidt (2012). 
6 See the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking, Art. 18.  
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enforcement. The disadvantages are that they are likely to be less cost-effective and 
they do not encourage technological innovation or to go beyond standards. 
o Performance-oriented requirements. They specify the required performance of the 
target population (for instance, certain tolerances, etc.). They do not detail the exact 
mechanisms by which compliance is obtained, but rather specify the criteria to be 
followed to achieve such compliance. They are often to be preferred to engineering 
or design standards, since they increase flexibility to achieve the performance 
desired. Such requirements should be flexible, allowing aggregation or offsetting 
between different plants or agents, even regionally or nationally provided this 
does not unacceptably affect the overall outcome. 
1.3 Regulation and innovation: Mapping interactions 
A review of the scholarly literature on the relationship between innovation and regulation 
suggests that in order for innovation to occur, entrepreneurs must have the willingness, 
opportunity/motivation, and capability or capacity to innovate, and that regulation can affect 
all three aspects.7 Recent contributions (Stewart, 2010, Carlin and Soskice, 2006) differentiate 
clearly between the incentive impact and the compliance cost of regulations. Stewart also 
summarises previous literature in defining three main dimensions that affect the impact of 
regulation on innovation: 
 Flexibility describes the number of implementation paths firms have available for 
compliance.  
 Information measures whether a regulation promotes more or less complete information 
in the market.  
 Stringency measures the degree to which a regulation requires compliance innovation 
and imposes a compliance burden on a firm, industry or market.  
Another important factor is uncertainty on the content and scope of future (upcoming) 
policies. Policy uncertainty reportedly has a mixed effect on innovation, although often it will 
precipitate the effects of the innovation dimensions of the regulation itself, regardless of 
whether the regulation is eventually enacted or not. Likewise, the compliance burden may 
affect firms prior to enactment if, in anticipation, they begin diverting resources toward 
compliance.  
A research paper published by the UK BERR in 2008 explored the main relationships and 
interactions between regulation and innovation and developed a conceptual model to map the 
relationship between regulation and innovation, of which we present a modified version in 
Figure 2 below.  
In the figure, the relationship starts with the definition of the policy objective and proceeds 
with the decision to use the regulatory framework (rather than taxes or public spending) to 
achieve it. Main forms of intervention include general regulation (economy-wide), innovation-
specific measures and sectoral regulation. They contribute to the EU acquis, and can affect both 
the supply-side and demand-side of the innovation ecosystem. They also contribute to general 
factors that affect innovation, such as the level of competition, productivity, skills, and 
investment. Changes in the innovation ecosystem may, in turn, affect policy outcomes. Such 
outcomes might lead to the need for more policy interventions, if policy problems persist (as 
in the “policy cycle” concept adopted by the European Commission since the 2010 
Communication on Smart Regulation). 
                                                   
7 Ashford (2000). 
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Figure 1. BERR’s model of the relationship between regulation and innovation 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration on BERR (2008). 
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1.3.1 Interactions between phases of innovation and regulation 
We observe that regulation affects incentives to innovate in various ways, and certainly 
interacts with all phases of the innovation cycle. As anticipated above, we assume that the 
decision to engage in innovation is a rational one, and as such depends on whether the 
expected “net benefits” of the innovation activity is positive. Everything that affects basic 
conditions for entrepreneurship and innovation should thus be included in this rather 
complex picture. More specifically:  
 The R&D and development phases of innovation are certainly affected by:  
o General rules applicable across sectors, such as competition rules, public 
procurement rules, infrastructure policy, bankruptcy legislation, and also 
education policy, which can affect the emergence of skills conducive to 
entrepreneurship, productivity and innovation. 
o Supply-side and demand-side innovation-specific regulation, such as patent laws, 
technology transfer legislation, tax credits on R&D, standardisation, pre-
commercial procurement regulations, obligations to cross-license, e.g. cases of 
blocking patents, etc.  
o Sector-specific rules, in particular for what concerns their stringency, timing and 
flexibility (see above). 
All phases of the regulatory process affect R&D and development: however, while the 
agenda-setting phase is relevant, as it implies the definition of the general content of the 
regulation, often the legislation phase can have an even more significant impact on the 
timing, stringency and flexibility of the regulation itself. Moreover, the extent to which 
the regulation creates compliance burdens (both administrative burdens and substantive 
compliance costs) is also a very relevant element, as it can alter the overall expected 
benefit from the innovative activity. Finally, all phases of the regulatory process 
contribute to legal certainty, which is another key element of the decision to engage in 
innovative activity.  
 The commercialisation phase is affected by a partly different set of rules, which include 
the following: 
o General rules such as competition rules, consumer protection rules, trade 
regulations, unfair competition and B2B unfair commercial practices rules, etc.  
o Sector-specific rules related to technology transfer, sectoral competition rules, 
administrative procedures related to the launch of new products, including 
authorisations, licenses, etc. 
1.4 Key questions 
1.4.1 Is regulation always an obstacle to innovation? 
No. The economic literature (starting from the seminal work of Ashford and later with the so-
called “Porter hypothesis”) has long recognised that regulation can be a powerful stimulus to 
innovation and entrepreneurship. The ultimate impact of regulation on innovation is an 
empirical, case-by-case question, and depends on the balance between innovation-inducing 
factors and innovation-constraining ones including compliance costs generated by regulation.  
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1.4.2 At what stages of the innovation process does EU regulation matter? 
EU regulation matters at all stages of the innovation process, from R&D to commercialisation. 
Individuals, firms and governments, when deciding on whether to engage with innovation, 
incorporate in their decisions general rules that shape the business environment, rules 
affecting market size (including, critically, also free movement, directly from the treaty), 
innovation-specific rules, but also sectoral rules and even rules that affect the later stages of 
the innovation process, e.g. rules on consumer protection.  
1.4.3 What categories of regulation can be distinguished according to its impact on 
innovation?  
We distinguish between general rules, innovation-specific rules, and sector-specific 
legislation. All three categories can have a significant impact on incentives to innovate, and 
this impact can, in all three cases, be either positive or negative. More in detail: 
o General regulation affects both the expected costs and benefits of innovative activity by 
affecting the general business environment, creating compliance and administrative 
burdens, reducing transaction costs, affecting ‘exit strategies’, e.g. bankruptcy laws, and 
more generally affecting the risk associated with innovation. 
o Innovation-specific rules directly affect incentives to innovate, normally reducing the cost 
of innovation, e.g. through the provision of dedicated funding in the form of debt or 
equity, or through exception from general rules as in the case of the technology transfer 
block exemption regulation. They can also unintentionally (and occasionally) hamper 
innovation: this is often the case with badly governed public funds, which can crowd 
out private funding and lead to inefficient selection of beneficiaries, e.g. the EIF not being 
always able to locate the most innovative start-ups. 
o Sector-specific regulation directly affects innovation. Based on the literature, the extent of 
such impact is a function of the stringency, timing, flexibility and uncertainty generated 
by the rules at hand. 
1.4.4 To what extent do different types of regulatory approaches affect incentives 
to innovate? 
Different types of regulatory approach can have different impacts on innovation. Even if a 
‘magic formula’ cannot be specified here, it can be tentatively concluded that more 
prescriptive, rigid regulation can hamper innovative activity by reducing the attractiveness of 
engaging in R&D, constraining modes of commercialisation, and creating lock-in effects that 
force the economy into suboptimal standards. The more regulation is flexible, such as in co-
regulatory settings (and subject to competition law constraints), or in the use of performance-
based or outcome-based standards, the more innovation can be stimulated. In addition, during 
the enforcement phase of regulation, the lower the costs of compliance and the administrative 
burdens, the more positive is the impact on innovation.  
More generally, an important finding of this section is the ultimate ambivalence of legal 
certainty, stringency, timing and flexibility with respect to innovation. Even legal uncertainty 
can be a stimulus of innovation in some cases, and an obstacle in others. Accordingly, in some 
cases solutions such as ‘sunrise clauses’ in legislation can become a powerful stimulus of 
innovation, but only provided that the timing and stringency of the rules at hand are 
conducive to innovation incentives. 
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2. Regulation and innovation: Enabling and constraining factors 
Moreover, we assume that innovation comes as a result of a rational choice by an individual 
(entrepreneur) or a firm, even if there are cases of unintentional innovation that occurs by 
serendipity. From this perspective, the incentive to innovate depends on a number of 
variables, which certainly include the following: 
 Availability of funding. The extent to which sources of funding are needed and available 
to move from the innovative idea to its commercialisation. 
 Ease of appropriation. The extent to which appropriation of the innovative idea is 
unlikely or impossible, and the cost of securing protection for the innovative idea. 
 Market size. The size of the potential market for the innovative product, process, or 
service. 
 Risk. The consequences of a failure of the innovative product, process or service and the 
cultural attitude towards failure.  
Accordingly, all policies that affect these variables have a general impact on the extent of 
innovation observed in a given market. Here are some examples: 
 Rules that make it easier and less burdensome for young entrepreneurs to secure 
funding from institutions in the form of equity or debt facilitate the entrepreneurship 
and innovation. 
 Rules on technology transfer from university to industry, e.g. the Baye-Dole Act in the 
United States, can facilitate the implementation of innovative ideas through patenting, 
acquisition and transfers of innovative ideas from the university to the private sector.  
 A simplification of the rules for access to credit guarantee schemes or other sources of 
funding for SMEs at the EU level can facilitate entrepreneurship.  
 Pre-commercial procurement can signal the existence of a large market for a future 
innovative solution, and as such stimulate innovation in specific fields. Similarly, 
regulations that impose “competitive dialogue” in public procurement can stimulate 
innovation by forcing companies to provide solutions to a pre-specified problem. 
 Competition rules that weaken property rights by introducing cases of compulsory 
licensing or mandatory access can, under certain conditions, weaken innovation 
incentives by reducing the reward from innovation of companies that become dominant 
in a given relevant market.  
 At the same time, very strong property rights might encourage disruptive, pioneer 
innovation, but might increase costs for follow-on inventors. To the contrary, regulation 
introducing compulsory licensing of infringed patents to the benefit of follow-on 
inventions at FRAND (Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory) conditions might 
weaken the incentive to invest in R&D in the first place, while at the same time 
improving the business case for incremental innovation. The most appropriate way to 
act will depend on the specific features of the market at hand, its degree of disruptive 
innovation versus path-dependency (as illustrated by the enlightening work of Brian 
Arthur).8  
                                                   
8 In the literature, there are ways to design regulation that can reconcile the incentives of pioneer and 
follow-on innovators: the literature on “blocking patents” and the blossoming literature on optional law 
(Ayres, 2005) can provide a first insight into ways to design regulation that can create a balanced 
environment for different modes of innovations. 
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 Rules on bankruptcy allowing a ‘second chance’ to entrepreneurs that have failed can, if 
coupled with adequate measures aimed at changing the perception of a failing 
entrepreneur among its peers, be conducive to more entrepreneurship.  
 Finally, rules that increase the level of legal certainty as regards the outlook for 
investment plans facilitate industrial innovation, as they make R&D easier to design and 
implement.  
Apart from regulatory measures that impact the general conditions and incentives for 
innovation, regulation can have a direct impact on the level of innovation in specific markets. 
This, as confirmed by our literature review, normally depends on the balance between the 
innovation-inducing and innovation-constraining elements of the regulation itself. Below, we 
discuss the five factors that can determine the impact of specific regulation on innovation. 
2.1 Major enabling/constraining aspects of regulation 
2.1.1 Administrative burdens 
Regulation that creates ‘red tape’ or administrative burdens for businesses can, under certain 
circumstances, deprive entrepreneurs of resources and time that would otherwise be devoted 
to more productive activities. On the other hand, innovation itself can be a source of 
administrative burdens, e.g. when market entrance is limited through heavy legal 
requirements such as pre-market approval (which is especially the case with additives, 
sweeteners, GMO-related food, supplements, novel and functional foods, as well as novel 
packaging and enzymes). These tendencies work to the disadvantage of the innovativeness of 
SMEs, which lack the resources to come up to strict legal requirements. Process innovations 
are necessary to increase efficiency in a globalising market. For SMEs innovation takes the 
character of combining new impulses with existing skills and routines (Gielen et al., 2003). The 
causes of the existing administrative burdens and drain of resources are embedded in required 
systems that guard against food-related diseases and maintain food quality. 
Governments have attached growing importance to administrative burden reduction 
programmes in recent years. The Netherlands is a pioneer in the development of a 
measurement system for administrative burdens, originally labelled MISTRAL, which gave 
rise to an international brand (the Standard Cost Model – SCM) that has been adopted by a 
growing number of countries in recent years. This has provided the impetus for the wide-
ranging efforts now in place across Europe to address administrative burdens.  
Several contributions in the literature have analysed the impact of entry requirements and 
regulatory compliance burdens on entrepreneurship; these include, most notably, the ease of 
doing business indicators and the ease of entrepreneurship index developed by The 
Conference Board. More important is singling out those pieces of legislation that are 
considered to hamper entrepreneurship most significantly, without creating substantial social 
benefits, and possibly designing an ad hoc regulatory framework for innovative 
entrepreneurs. Contributions in the literature have demonstrated that start-up costs are 
considerably higher in more regulated economies (Fonseca et al., 2001, 2007), and that 
regulatory reform results in higher rates of market entry by new firms (Klapper and Love, 
2011). A recent paper by Braunerhjelm and Eklund (2013) based on World Bank data from 118 
countries for a period of six years finds that the entry rate of new firms is significantly reduced 
by the tax administrative burden, and that this effect is unrelated to general taxes on corporate 
profits and is robust to the inclusion of several important control variables. 
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2.1.2 Compliance burdens (stringency) 
Stringency relates to how difficult and costly it is for firms to comply with new regulatory 
requirements using existing ideas, technologies, processes and business models. According to 
Ashford et al. (1985), stringency is the most important factor influencing technological 
innovation. A regulation is judged to be stringent if firms need to significantly change their 
behaviour or develop new technology in order to comply with the regulation. Accordingly, 
stringency comes with significant compliance costs (see Renda et al., 2014).  
A significantly stringent regulation can act as a double-edged sword: when the distance 
between regulatory requirement and the status quo is excessive, firms not able to comply (for 
technical or financial reasons) with the new requirements might go out of business. When this 
is the case, the innovation-enhancing potential of stringent rules is replaced by a discouraging 
effect on existing firms.  
Examples of very stringent regulations that have triggered innovation include, according to 
Gerard and Lave (2005), the US 1970 Clean Air Act, which stipulated 90% reductions in tailpipe 
emissions over a four- to five-year period, to be enforced by a newly established 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). They noted that the technical requirements were 
deliberately technology-forcing. They concluded that even though car manufacturers were not 
able to meet the performance standards by the stipulated deadline, it did lead to two pre-
eminent technologies – the catalytic converter in 1975 and the three-way catalyst in 1981. These 
control technologies helped reduce aggregate emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide 
and nitrogen oxides between 1975 and 1985 even though the distances travelled by vehicles 
increased over the same period by 34%. 
Similarly, the new crash tests discussed by the European Commission in the proposed 
regulation on the protection of pedestrians and vulnerable road users were denounced by the 
car industry as imposing excessive compliance costs. More specifically, Directive 
2003/102/EC made a limited number of passive safety systems mandatory by 1 January 2005, 
and triggered investment on the industry side to adapt to the new requirements (so-called 
“Phase I” requirements). However, “Phase II”, mandatory as of 1 January 2010, elicited an 
early reaction by the industry, which managed to demonstrate that the requirements were not 
feasible; Phase II requirements were ultimately replaced by a mix of active and passive safety 
measures.9  
To the contrary, there are cases in which the regulatory requirements are not sufficiently 
‘distant’ from current technology. Ashford et al. (1985: 464) use the example of the 1972 
asbestos standards introduced by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
and conclude that:  
…the failure to adopt a 0.1 fiber/cc standard, the lowest level detectable, for worker 
asbestos exposure inhibited development of substitute products by the asbestos 
industry. The industry was able to comply with the 2 fiber/cc standard simply by 
installing existing pollution control equipment. By failing to adopt the more stringent 
standard, OSHA effectively inhibited new product development and product 
substitution.  
From available experience and evidence, it seems that regulation can spur innovation through 
stringent requirements provided that the distance to be covered by targeted stakeholders is 
                                                   
9 Regulation (EC) No. 78/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on the 
type-approval of motor vehicles with regard to the protection of pedestrians and other vulnerable road 
users, amending Directive 2007/46/EC and repealing Directives 2003/102/EC and 2005/66/EC. 
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not excessive, and that the outcome is specified in a technology-neutral, non-prescriptive way, 
which allows for experimentation of various solutions and, as such, innovative compliance.  
2.1.3 Timing 
The amount of time that a regulation gives to the targeted stakeholders for compliance with 
the regulatory requirements is essential to stimulate innovation. Here, too, timing is a double-
edged sword: too little time might discourage innovation and determine an unsustainable 
increase of compliance burdens, too much time might crystallise innovation efforts due to the 
lack of pressure to meet the requirements. The optimal timing is, once again, a case-by-case 
issue, but it should be always considered by a regulator when assessing the impact of 
proposed regulations on innovation.  
BERR (2008) and Centre for International Economics (2006) discuss specifically the timing of 
standardisation: the message is that standardisation should not occur too early, and also not 
too late, for stimulating and encouraging innovation. An early standard can kill alternatives 
(see our case study on GSM below), creating more intra-standard competition. If the standard 
is imposed too early, this can generate an undesirable lock-in effect that leaves society trapped 
in a suboptimal standard. Similarly, the selection of a rigid, non-scalable standard can inhibit 
both incremental and disruptive innovation, and as such is highly damaging to social welfare 
and progress.  
2.1.4 Flexibility  
As already recalled, flexible, performance- or outcome-based regulation stimulates innovation 
more than purely prescriptive regulation does. To the contrary, rules that prescribe specific 
materials or technology requirements give no market prospect to those that want to 
experiment with alternative solutions. Flexibility is particularly important when it comes to 
(European) standards. The “New Approach” to standardisation in the EU is a clear example 
of outcome-based standardisation, which can help innovation (this is discussed in section 3.1). 
Standards based on functional or performance-based technical specifications, rather than on 
purely prescriptive specifications, offer more room for innovative bidders to propose new 
products. Also, the early development of a formal open standard during the development of 
a new technology gives the first mover a competitive advantage, whereas, in the long run, it 
increases competition and lowers the cost of the innovative technology.  
2.1.5 Uncertainty 
Like most of the other variables discussed in this section, uncertainty can act as a driver and 
inhibitor of innovation. Under certain circumstances, uncertainty can be beneficial, as firms 
try to anticipate or avoid future regulation by exploring alternatives. Ashford et al. (1985) 
claim that “although excessive regulatory uncertainty may cause industry inaction on the part 
of the industry too much certainty will stimulate only minimum compliance technology. 
Similarly too frequent change of regulatory requirements may frustrate technological 
development.”10 
More generally, it is fair to state that whenever innovation requires large investment in R&D, 
the absence of reasonable stability or certainty in the regulatory framework can significantly 
hinder innovation. Our case study of competition rules applied in the e-communications sector 
below can contribute to shedding some light on this aspect of uncertainty.  
                                                   
10 Ashford et al. (1985: 426). 
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2.2 Standards and innovation 
Standards serve a number of functions including:  
 Performance/outcome – standards can define desired performance criteria or desired 
‘outcomes’, enabling products or services to achieve the desired effects without 
restricting the freedom of ‘innovators’ design their products and services.  
 Measurement – standards can convey technical information in a transparent and 
consistent manner, enabling innovators to benchmark the performance of their 
products/services and processes and compare it against those of their competitors.  
 Compatibility/interface – standards can help innovators work to ensure that new 
products, services and technologies are compatible with existing ones, thereby 
promoting open and competitive markets.  
 Quality – standards can communicate to consumers that new products, services and 
technologies meet socially desired minimum levels of quality and safety, e.g. health and 
safety and environmental standards.  
 Variance reduction – standards can promote conformity between products, services and 
technologies brought to market, thereby enabling producers to exploit economies of 
scale and enabling users to have confidence in their choice of product. 
Table 1. Standards and innovation: Positive and negative effects 
Type of standard Positive effects on innovation Negative effects on innovation 
Compatibility/ 
Interoperability 
 Network externalities  Monopoly power 
 Avoiding lock-in of old 
technologies 
 Lock in old technologies in case 
of strong network externalities 
 Increasing variety of system 
products 
  
 Efficiency in supply chains   
Minimum 
quality/Safety  
 Avoiding adverse selection  Raising rivals’ costs 
 Creating trust  
 Reducing transaction costs   
Variety reduction 
 Economies of scale  Reducing choice 
 Critical mass in emerging 
technologies/industries  
 Market concentration 
  Premature selection of 
technologies 
Information  Providing codified knowledge   
Source: Blind (2012). 
 
Swann (2010) provided a comprehensive update of the state of the art in the economics of 
standardisation, reporting, on the basis of a detailed literature review, that several detailed 
econometric studies carried out for the UK, Germany, France, Canada and Australia 
established a clear connection at a macroeconomic level between standardisation in the 
economy, productivity growth and overall economic growth. Crucially, while it is commonly 
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believed that standards obstruct innovation, the evidence suggests a rather different story. 
Surveys of innovating firms find that standards are a source of information that helps their 
innovation activities. Moreover, while many say that regulations also constrain their 
innovation activities, these constraints do not necessarily prevent innovation. Moreover, these 
‘informing’ and ‘constraining’ effects tend to occur together. In addition, standards can 
contribute to: i) the exploitation of economies of scale; ii) the effective division of labour; iii) 
the building of competencies; iv) reducing barriers to entry; v) building network effects; vi) 
reducing transaction costs; and vii) increasing trust between trading partners. 
Recently, Blind (2013), in its paper for NESTA, shows the positive and negative impacts often 
correlated with different types of standards.  
3. EU regulation and innovation: Trends and case studies 
3.1 Context and structure 
The present section deals more concretely with how EU regulatory trends as well as specific 
EU regulation (in seven selected cases) enable and/or disable innovation. Section 3.2 
underlines the fundamental reason why regulation is the EU’s ‘core business’, followed in 
section 3.3 by a sketch of EU regulatory trends over three decades showing that, broadly, EU 
regulation has become more facilitating for innovation, especially by removing excessive 
restrictiveness in many instances (except in a few cases where the precautionary principle is 
loosely applied), and a means for making the EU more market-driven. The key word in these 
trends is invariably the deepening and widening (in scope) of the EU single market. Section 
3.4 presents two cases of horizontal EU regulation, one fostering innovation via an exemption 
in EU competition policy, the other concerning strategic public procurement with a view to 
innovation. Section 3.5 comprises five cases of sectoral EU regulation, three examples where 
EU regulation enables, if not stimulates, innovation (energy efficiency regulation for domestic 
appliances, innovation facilitated by European standards such as GSM and for smart meters, 
and EU regulation for end-of-life vehicles) and two where EU regulation hinders or disables 
innovation (REACH for chemicals and selected EU biotech rules).  
3.2 Why regulation has become the EU’s ‘core business’ 
The ‘hard core’ of what the EU does is summed up in the term “internal market”. It includes 
many ‘common’ policies employing EU regulation. Some such EU regulation is horizontal, but 
most of the regulatory acquis is sectoral. Based on the foundation of the ‘four free movements’ 
(goods, services, capital, labour)11 and the right of establishment, which in and of themselves 
are also likely to exert a positive influence on innovative activities given that market size has 
a well-known positive effect on innovation, EU regulation is a response to market failures (and 
to member states employing very different regulatory approaches to overcome such market 
failures, making a mockery of the single market) that would render the ‘proper functioning’ 
                                                   
11 One may wish to add the free movement of codified technology and knowledge as a ‘fifth’ free 
movement, although this is now guaranteed by secondary EU legislation on copyright, trademarks, 
rules on designs, neighbouring rights and, recently, also a European patent. This is the result of Art. 
345, TFEU on national systems of property rights, an article (never changed since the Rome treaty) that 
does not distinguish government ownership of, say, land and companies, from IPRs. The single market 
logic strongly suggests to ‘unbundle’ these two and amend the treaty by inserting the fifth free 
movement, reflecting the acquis with a more powerful legal basis.  
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of the single market either impossible or at least suboptimal. It is for this fundamental reason 
that, nowadays, with the free movements and the right of establishment so firmly agreed and 
accepted, the EU’s ‘core business’ is essentially the making, improving or removing EU 
regulation. A good understanding of how the EU influences innovation requires a profound 
appreciation and assessment of the EU regulatory acquis. At first sight, such an ambition might 
be regarded as a massive undertaking. One may illustrate this with some basic figures: given 
a fairly narrow concept of the internal market, this regulatory acquis would comprise some 
1,500 directives and nearly 2,000 EU regulations, many of them highly complicated.12  
As the Monti report (Monti, 2010) reminded us, no fewer than 15 DGs of the Commission work 
routinely on internal market rules. Many of these directives and regulations have a sectoral 
slant and frequently these are likely to have a direct impact on incentives to engage in 
innovative activities and on the direction of innovation. Furthermore, some directives are 
mainly concerned with commonly agreed (health, safety, environmental, consumer 
protection) objectives, while leaving the technical specifications to European standardisation 
bodies via mandates or other means. Some 3,000 CEN standards and many CENELEC/ETSI 
standards are directly linked to such EU objectives in secondary legislation, thereby giving 
companies, using these standards correctly, a ‘presumption of conformity’. This presumption 
amounts to free movement, that is, access to the huge internal market, a formidable incentive 
to innovate. In addition, one should also be aware of rules on (national and regional) public 
procurement and EU rules on competition in the broad sense.13 
3.3 EU regulatory trends over three decades 
Trends in EU regulation since the mid-1980s have to be understood in the context of a 
continuous deepening and widening of the internal market and against the backdrop of more 
general trends in the OECD, if not worldwide, to let market forces determine the dynamics of 
the economy (including innovation) unless there are market failures. Thus a tendency can be 
observed that risk regulation dealing with, e.g. health, safety and environmental objectives, is 
justified but needs to be least-cost and backed up by scientific and factual evidence in sound 
risk and regulatory impact assessments. Where regulation interferes with market mechanisms 
without the justification of market failures, the tendency has clearly been one of reducing or 
abolishing such regimes, or (as in network industries) only regulating the natural monopoly 
segments as well as access to networks whilst using regulators so as to effectively and swiftly 
nip in the bud anti-competitive conduct against new entrants. This was accompanied by a 
gradual but consistent move to privatise numerous companies.  
Figure 2 below summarises the trend in EU regulation over four periods since the early 1980s: 
the days before the Single European Act of 1985 with still many rigidities and countless 
obstacles in the internal market; between 1985 and 1993 when the famous EC1992 programme 
was successfully pursued; between 1993 and 2003 when competitiveness became increasingly 
linked to EU regulation, leading among other things to EU regulatory impact assessment; and 
from 2004 until today, with “Better Regulation” and impact assessment dominating most EU 
regulation. After 1993, the deepening of the internal market continued, even in areas formerly 
considered too sensitive, e.g. many services and network industries. It is not an exaggeration 
to say that these trends have radically transformed the EU regulatory landscape, which now 
features far more market-friendly, better conceived and better justified EU regulation, whilst 
                                                   
12 Not counting many decisions (to specific addressees) and recommendations. 
13 This implies strict disciplines on abuse of dominant position, cartels and other forms of cooperation 
between firms, mergers and takeovers, the functioning of companies in network industries (usually 
closely related to EU regulation of such network markets) and state aids, often sectorally differentiated.  
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old rigidities in EU rules or unjustified interventions have either been abolished or 
significantly revised. Also, interventionist policies such as the common agricultural policy 
and, e.g. EU and national industrial policies, have become more market-friendly or more 
horizontal. It is of course hard to generalise about the effects on innovation, but it would seem 
justified to hold that, at least in many instances, these trends have worked out favourably 
relative to the innovation climate in the EU. But as we shall see in subsection 3.5 on sectoral 
cases, there are exceptions to this favourability, typically related to the (too loose) application 
of the precautionary principle: these tend to hinder or cripple innovation more often than not.  
Figure 2. Trends of EU Regulatory Reforms 1985-2014 
 
 
Notes: C&C = command & control regulation; SPS = health and safety measures in food, feed and plants, 
e.g. diseases; IM = internal market; IPRs = intellectual property rights; MS = member states; RIA = 
regulatory impact assessment; MR = mutual recognition. 
Starting from 1985, in EU regulation, the Union gradually moved from a rather political 
approach to harmonising the national regulations at member state level into common EU 
directives, at first often based on hard fought compromises under a veto system in the Council, 
to a much more rational and far less costly system of ‘better’ EU regulation. This 
transformation has favoured innovation, while resulting in several improvements in the EU 
regulatory regime.  
 First, the veto system for (most) internal market regulation was removed, with further 
limitations to the application of vetoes in later treaty amendments. Qualified majority 
voting tends to generate a more functional attitude to the substance and proportionality 
of EU legislation and ‘blocking minorities’ usually require concessions from what 
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formerly would have been a vetoing member state. Also, all kinds of idiosyncratic but 
costly exceptions or even blockages (due to veto threats) have largely disappeared or 
have to be justified.  
 Second, the EC-1992 programme generated a far more constructive spirit in the Council, 
often led by a troika of three successive presidencies pushing for a rapid and disciplined 
pursuit of the seven-year calendar to deepen and widen the internal market. The same 
spirit has often been generated in the European Parliament since it obtained near-
complete co-legislative powers (between the Single Act and Lisbon, in steps).  
 Third, the thinking about ‘good’ EU market regulation received a major boost with 
mutual recognition and the “New Approach” initiated in 1985.14 The central idea 
underlying the New Approach, inspired by the mutual recognition doctrine of the Court 
of European Justice (CJEU), is that, when risks are not too serious, EU regulation can be 
‘light’ – that is, consist of a mere agreement on objectives (concerning, say, health, safety, 
etc.), plus some procedural issues – and the technical specifications detailed in European 
standards. This can be done only as long as i) it is ensured that such standards are serving 
these EU objectives, ii) the standards are ‘performance’ standards (and not design 
standards; performance standards are flexible and non-prescriptive, leaving a lot of 
scope for innovation) and iii) all this is backed up by a reliable conformance system all 
the way up to accreditation and ex post market surveillance.  
 Fourth, the New Approach prompted a rethink in other areas of EU regulation, first in 
goods and later in services. This was largely driven by competitiveness concerns. 
Eventually, this led to a much greater preoccupation about the costs and benefits of EU 
regulation, culminating in the introduction of RIAs, regulatory impact assessments, of 
all legislative proposals in 2003. RIAs and the Commission Guidelines have improved 
significantly since those early days. The logic of these guidelines is rooted in the 
economics of ‘good’ regulatory practices, driven by the economic literature and by 
stimulating OECD work. The quality of RIAs has been controlled by a semi-independent 
Impact Assessment Board since 2007 and this has had a healthy effect.15  
All these reforms in EU regulation, in combination with firm case law by the CJEU on free 
movement and unjustifiable barriers, have had a positive influence on innovation, as 
compared to prior practices of EU regulation. It has improved (internal) market functioning, 
made life easier for new entrants and greatly facilitated market access between member states, 
whilst at the same time reducing compliance burdens (including ‘red tape’), thus freeing 
resources. As noted, both rules and European standards have purposefully retained significant 
scope for innovative solutions. For environmental regulation, the EU has increasingly opted 
for market-driven instead of command-and-control regulation, in particular by setting end-
targets with minimal (or no) specification of how these targets ought to be met (hence, 
                                                   
14 Called the New Legislative Framework since 2008, based on Reg. 765/2008 (mainly on accreditation 
and market surveillance on New Approach and other goods), Reg. 764/2008 on mutual recognition 
procedures (facilitating intra-EU market access for companies, with greater legal certainty) and Decision 
768/2008 with a complete ‘model’ for new directives and revisions of existing directives in these 
markets for testing and certification (with various modules), accreditation and market surveillance. This 
should be read together with the new EU standardisation package, enacted in Reg. 1025/2012 of 25 
October 2012, in OJEU L 316, and the proposed product safety and market surveillance package 
proposed in COM (2013) 74 of 13 Feb 2013.  
15 See Fristch et al. (2013). 
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allowing innovative approaches based on entrepreneurial choices) or by establishing cap-and-
trade systems, e.g. for CO2, with similar entrepreneurial discretion. 
3.4 Horizontal legislation: case studies 
3.4.1 Case study: Refusal to deal in competition law and e-communications 
regulation 
A good example of a general rule that can affect the overall incentive to engage in innovation 
is found in the field of antitrust law. One of the most frequently cited is the approach to ‘refusal 
to deal’, i.e. a case of exclusionary abuse of dominance, as such regulated by Article 102 TFEU. 
The significance of this example is even greater since this specific rule has had a profound 
impact on ex ante regulatory regimes such as the one for electronic communications in force 
in Europe since 2003 (Renda, 2010; Pelkmans and Renda, 2011).  
The CJEU has clarified on several occasions the cumulative conditions that have to be met 
before compulsory third-party access to networks can be enforced under community 
competition law. These conditions include that the refusal relates to a product or service that 
is objectively necessary to be able to compete effectively on a downstream market, is likely to 
eliminate effective competition in the downstream market, is likely to lead to consumer harm 
and is not objectively justified. 
The 2008 Commission Guidance document on exclusionary abuses clarifies that  
The existence of…an obligation [to supply] — even for a fair remuneration — may 
undermine undertakings’ incentives to invest and innovate and, thereby, possibly 
harm consumers. The knowledge that they may have a duty to supply against their 
will may lead dominant undertakings — or undertakings who anticipate that they may 
become dominant — not to invest, or to invest less, in the activity in question. Also, 
competitors may be tempted to free ride on investments made by the dominant 
undertaking instead of investing themselves. Neither of these consequences would, in 
the long run, be in the interest of consumers. 
The delicate balance struck by the CJEU ruling on refusal to deal has been shaken a few times 
in recent years. In addition, in the European Commission’s April 2004 decision against 
Microsoft, the “exceptional and cumulative set of circumstances” test was partly rejected by 
the Commission, but it decided to condemn Microsoft anyway. This situation created a serious 
problem of legal certainty within the EU: the set of circumstances under which antitrust rules 
could lead to the imposition of mandatory third-party access to the dominant firm’s own assets 
was now uncertain, and as such unpredictable. The Court of First Instance decision on the 
same case in September 2007, and the already mentioned guidance paper on the treatment of 
exclusionary abuses under article 82 (now 102 TFEU), partly solved the problem. 
What remains to be fully ascertained is whether a rather rigid application of the rule in both 
antitrust and ex ante regulation could lead to a weakening of incentives to innovate. In 
principle, first inventors should be discouraged by a rule that allows competitors to access the 
winning rival’s own assets. At the same time, however, incremental innovation could be 
facilitated by the application of an essential facilities rule.  
3.4.2 Case study: The strategic use of public procurement 
One of the most widely acknowledged forms of demand-side innovation policy is the use of 
public procurement in support of innovation, and in particular of the “competitive dialogue” 
as well as the so-called “pre-commercial procurement”. The latter guarantees significant 
demand for new products and services. 
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Figure 3 below shows a representative scheme for pre-commercial procurement and public 
procurement for commercial roll-out of innovative products, as interpreted by the European 
Commission. As shown in the figure, procurement can be launched even at very early stages 
of innovation, such as the development of product ideas and the elaboration of solution 
designs, but also at the prototype and successive launch phases of innovative products up to 
the development and procurement of commercial end products.  
Figure 3. Pre-commercial procurement: a European Commission scheme 
 
 
It is widely acknowledged that public procurement is insufficiently used to stimulate 
innovation in Europe for many reasons, including the following: 
 Wrong incentives. Procurers tend to favour low cost, low risk, and ‘off the shelf’ 
solutions even when there are longer-term benefits to the public service provider in 
testing and procuring new technologies and solutions. Moreover, there is a first-mover 
problem. 
 Public procurers’ lack of knowledge of what new technologies and innovations are, or 
could be, available in the markets – in particular for developments outside their 
regions/countries. This is compounded by the lack of dialogue between procurers and 
supplier companies. 
 No strategy that links public procurement with public policy objectives, e.g. health, 
environment, transport, and Research, Development and Innovation (R&D&I) support 
initiatives (typically grant-funded). Fragmentation in demand with individual 
procurements too small for companies to make innovative investments, and no 
mechanisms to allow the pooling of risk and resources across countries.  
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 SMEs cannot cope with public procurement at the first stage; more often they act as 
subcontractors. This hampers the access of public authorities to the innovative potential 
of SMEs, while SMEs are important creators of innovations and innovative solutions. 
In 2006 the European Commission launched the “Lead Market Initiative” (LMI) as a first 
attempt to engage in demand-side innovation policy. The LMI’s long-term goals are: to remove 
obstacles preventing European enterprises from entering new and quickly growing global 
markets; to facilitate faster uptake of new products, services and technologies; and to bridge 
the gap between the generation of new products, services and technologies and the success of 
those innovations on the market. 
Six lead markets were chosen: sustainable construction, technical textiles for intelligent 
personal protective clothing and equipment, bio-based products, recycling, eHealth and 
renewable energy. These markets are highly innovative and provide solutions of broader 
strategic, societal, environmental and economic application. The impact in the six lead markets 
were regarded as positive in a 2011 evaluation report, but LMI requires a more consistent 
application through the EU-28 in order to produce even greater impacts.  
It is also of interest that the new public procurement Directive 2014/24 comprises several 
improvements with a view to fostering innovative solutions. Thus there are now more 
possibilities for additional flexibility in choosing a procurement procedure that provides for 
negotiations, which is relevant for authorities having difficulty in predefining full technical 
solutions for complex contracts. If the market does not offer ready-made solutions, contracting 
authorities can establish a long-term partnership for the development and subsequent 
purchase of a new innovative product or service. 
3.5 Sectoral regulation: Case studies 
3.5.1 Case study: Energy efficiency regulation for equipment and cars and 
innovation16 
An instructive example of the positive interaction between EU regulation and innovation is 
found in energy efficiency regulation of household equipment, other small, e.g. office, 
equipment and cars. The general purpose of this category of EU regulation is to reduce energy 
consumption for a given use of equipment or of cars, in the light of the overall EU climate 
strategy to cut greenhouse gas emissions. An associated EU benefit of such regulation is the 
positive effect on energy security. Three regulatory instruments are of importance: consumer-
friendly colour labels, mandatory energy limits and credible compliance. Labelling’s first 
purpose is to inform the consumer before or at the moment of purchasing the equipment or 
the car, and to do so in non-jargon terms. Colour labels can thus function as incentive 
regulation: incentive for consumers to buy greener products and incentives for suppliers to 
innovate and satisfy the incipient demand for greener products that reduce consumer 
expenses for energy.  
However, since the early 1990s many OECD and other countries have added ‘hard’ energy 
targets by means of specific energy limits for many types of equipment17 and for personal cars. 
This would seem to be ‘command-and-control’ regulation, but that is only correct with respect 
to the energy limit. In fact, it has been employed in a fairly sophisticated, incentivising manner 
in combination with colour labels, also over time. The colour label preceded the introduction 
                                                   
16 This case is based on Ellis (2007); Pelkmans et al. (2014), and informal sources and interviews. 
17 For home appliances and office equipment, these targets are called MEPS, minimum energy 
performance standards. Strictly, this is a misnomer as standards are, by definition, voluntary.  
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of ‘hard’ targets. For the producers, the function of the colour label in the case of home 
appliances was to allow them some time to adapt their offerings and make them greener – a 
direct stimulus of innovation – before the hard energy limits became mandatory. Once 
ambitious compulsory targets were set, the colour labels appeared to be identical but, in fact, 
only referred to appliances still allowed on the market. The EU’s first energy labelling directive 
was enacted in 1992 (92/75). Later revisions have tightened the mandatory targets 
considerably and the industry has responded with successive innovations in order to comply 
or even stay ahead of new constraints. It is telling that the problem nowadays has transformed: 
almost all appliances have reached what originally was the A status on the labels (green 
colour), thereby significantly reducing the incentivising effect and information clarity for 
consumers. The colour labels will have to be revised in order to maintain the same 
effectiveness as before (possibly by establishing a new classification of energy use per 
appliance underlying the colour labelling system).  
The enormous success of energy efficiency regulation for appliances is mainly due to the 
unexpected outcome of the interaction between regulation and innovation. Some 25 years ago 
it was widely feared that compulsory energy efficiency targets, leading to greater energy 
savings than the market had generated in response to colour label incentives for consumers, 
would lead to rising costs and prices and only relatively marginal improvement of energy 
performance. But this did not happen, quite the contrary: “…all products examined have 
experienced a decline in real prices between 10% to 45%, while energy efficiency increased by 
10% to 60%…”18 These gains have been accomplished without a decline in service. Only top 
products fell in price very slightly, but that turned out to be caused by other, e.g. luxury or 
high quality, features.  
Comparing this happy ‘win-win’ of lower prices and better energy performance with cars and, 
e.g. (noisy) outdoor equipment, can help one to understand better the interaction between EU 
regulation and product innovation. For personal cars, a similar emission colour label was 
introduced. Eventually, however, tightening of the emission requirements forced companies 
to focus on disruptive rather than mere incremental innovation, by focusing on new types of 
engines, e.g. on hydrogen directly or with fuel cells, or hybrids; electric vehicles; use of natural 
gas or LPG, although this technique is hardly new, whilst radically improving the performance 
of diesel engines (some 25% of the car fleet uses diesel in Europe). Disruptive innovation of 
car engines is hindered by a chicken-and-egg problem, in that hydrogen or electric (or, for that 
matter, LPG) cannot be sold before widespread and costly infrastructure is available, but 
investment in such infrastructure is held back by the slow emergence of consumer-friendly 
features of such new technologies. What is comparable with appliances is that the real prices 
of personal cars, with many more features and greater safety than decades ago thanks to 
permanent and successful innovation, have not changed since the early 1980s.  
The case of noisy outdoor equipment is also instructive, for another reason. In order to prevent 
outdoor construction or gardening equipment from generating too much noise, noise limits 
were regulated in Directive 2000/14 for 22 types of equipment, including a noise label based 
on technical jargon. A user-friendly colour label to incentivise purchasers to buy low-noise 
equipment would not work, because there is no pecuniary incentive whatsoever: no lower 
taxation (for cars) and no savings over the product’s lifetime (appliances). This implies that 
the only effective regulatory option would seem to be to lower the noise limits of regulated 
outdoor equipment. However, lower noise is regarded as a costly issue for producers, due to 
the fact that engine heat and emission requirements may well cause a trade-off, leading to 
higher prices and hurting competitiveness in export markets. The EU has never dared to push 
                                                   
18 M. Ellis (2007: 13). The OECD/IEA report covers data collection from the late 1980s to 2005.  
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for lower noise targets and find out through practical experience whether such hard 
requirements would induce more radical innovation. 
3.5.2 Case study: Innovation via European standards. GSM and smart meters19 
Standards can sometimes inhibit innovation, especially when compatibility or interoperability 
is essential. But (European) standards can also be used explicitly to pursue innovation. Two 
such cases will be very briefly presented. One is the European 2G digital mobile telephony 
standard GSM, the other is about ‘smart meters’. The rationale for presenting these two 
examples is that it is next to impossible to generalise about European standards.  
GSM is known as a successful example of a European standard stimulating a breakthrough 
(disruptive) technology in mobile at the time, with a highly positive (though temporary) 
impact on the EU mobile equipment industry’s competitiveness. In terms of the economic 
literature on network compatibility standards, it is a cooperative industry-wide 
standardisation strategy but with explicit direct as well as indirect government intervention at 
national and EU level. It is in many ways a unique experience, very hard replicate in other 
areas, in view of the huge costs and the fact that the early stages were fully funded by telecoms 
monopolies. GSM is open, non-proprietary, and interoperable and offers high systems 
capacity (compared to analogue), high voice capacity and some other sophisticated functions. 
In order to appreciate the innovation aspect, one should not merely concentrate on the 
technical standardisation itself, even though this was impressive. It is the ‘standard adoption 
strategy’ that rendered GSM so special, with various pre-commitment mechanisms agreed and 
intensified over time. There was a Memorandum of Understanding between telecoms 
operators with detailed principles of joint pro-competitive procurement, cross-border roaming 
and planning. The EU enacted directives on frequencies, on competition in telecoms terminals 
(such as handsets) and on mutual recognition of conformity of telecoms terminals, in addition 
to a recommendation and, later, a Commission mandate for ETSI to take over the technical 
standard issues. There were drawbacks, too, but these did not hold back innovation; on the 
contrary, they may have helped innovation to be so successful (but with costs and risks).  
One drawback is that the non-proprietary GSM turned out to be less open than foreseen, due 
to a kind of patent pool with free cross-licensing only for those few companies having patented 
(some 140) ‘essential technologies’ for GSM. As a result, companies with markets in analogue 
had almost no chance to join effectively; neither could the Japanese equipment suppliers get 
in. Another drawback was that a few cheap and very simple applications of digital mobile 
were suppressed on purpose in order not to dilute the expensive drive to mass market 
introduction. A third drawback turned out to be the lock-in effect for 3G, for which the CDMA 
airface (from Qualcomm) is better suited than the TDMA one underlying GSM. The longer-
run consequence has been very costly for EU equipment suppliers as their initial competitive 
advantage melted away with new competitors, and even further with newer software 
applications, e.g. Android, and 4G. In June 2014 EU and Korean companies decided to try to 
be first movers on 5G. Nevertheless, there is no doubt about the phenomenal success of GSM 
in and outside Europe and the positive effects on EU manufacturers’ competitiveness. Also, 
the telecoms companies, mostly privatised by (around) 2000, benefitted due to mass 
consumption of services, new business models, e.g. pre-pay, and excessive roaming charges 
long after the set-up costs had been recouped. Because GSM was introduced simultaneously 
                                                   
19 The two instances in this case are based on Pelkmans (2001); Bekkers et al. (2002); 
CEN/CENELEC/ETSI (2011, 2012); and European Commission (2011). 
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with telecoms liberalisation in the EU, the consumer could benefit not only from the highly 
popular new technology but also from far lower services tariffs, except for roaming. 
A smart meter is an electronic device that records consumption of electricity (or gas or water) 
and communicates this information to the supplier of electricity very regularly; however, 
modern smart meters enable two-way communication between the meter and the central 
system. The drive behind modern smart meters is explained by energy savings, i.e. efficiency. 
No less than 80% of electricity consumers ought to have such a meter by 2020. However, it was 
quickly understood that such meters better be standardised in the EU if scale and cost 
reduction are to be realised. Some 110 different standards were found to exist in the member 
states in 2009; there were battery- and mains-powered meters and distinct national 
architectures. Therefore, in order not to inhibit technological developments, a common 
‘toolbox’ of standards has been defined, which facilitate metering deployments. The two 
critical technological areas in this field are communication and information technology. There 
is a strong innovation drive behind the programme, in that the entire Advanced Metering 
Architecture and not just the meters are covered, permitting explicit links with smart grids 
and eMobility standardisation, two highly dynamic areas. In addition, all kinds of potential 
applications became feasible based on the digital communication with the network operator. 
This in turn led to much more radical thinking about what are now called ‘smart grids’, of 
which smart meters would be only one component. In the 2011 report on the relevant 
Commission Mandate M/441, a first list of existing standards and 37 suggested new standard 
ideas was reported. By the end of 2012, in a second report, 56 standards were defined or ready 
for a vote. The coordination group is expected to stay active until 2020 for new applications 
and links with smart grids in particular.  
3.5.3 Case study: The End-of-life Vehicles Directive20 
The End-of-Life Vehicles Directive 2000/53, and subsequent (comitology) regulations, e.g. in 
2003, and decisions on regular updates of technical Annex II (the last in 2013), aim to reduce 
waste arising from end-of-life vehicles (ELV) for cars and light commercial vehicles. There are 
four stakeholders: the producer, the recycling industry, the last holder and the authorities 
(mainly, member states); however, the leading principle involved is EPR, extended producer 
responsibility. An ELV can no longer be part of the second-hand car market for technical or 
economic reasons, but it may still have economic value for the parts/components collectors, 
recyclers and/or shredders (of the car hulk). This implies that ‘regulation’ may take the form 
of a voluntary agreement, if enforceable, possibly between industries as they might have 
conflicting interests and these have to be internalised, or of a compulsory rule. However, to a 
considerable degree, ELVs can be dealt with by markets themselves, if subject to strict 
environmental rules for dismantling, recycling and waste disposal (in the US there is no ELV 
regulation, but the EPA maintains strict monitoring of the environmental aspects), because of 
the value in ELVs. The EU has clearly opted for targets going (gradually) beyond what a 
market-based approach might be expected to achieve.  
To have a rough idea of the ELV process, for a typical car, some 75% of its weight consists of 
ferrous and non-ferrous (especially aluminium) metals and 25% of rubber, fluids, plastics and 
other materials. The quantitative targets are: the reuse and recycling of 80% of the car weight 
in 2006, up to 85% by 2015; reuse and recovery of at least 85% in 2006 and 95% in 2015. In 2011, 
of the 14 million deregistered cars in the EU, the number of ELVs was probably 7.8 million. 
                                                   
20 This case is based on Zoboli et al. (2000); European Parliament (2010); and Sakai et al. (2014).  
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The remainder are either exported legally or illegally to third countries or simply kept in 
private garages.  
The ELV Directive has had and still has a significant impact on innovation in the car and car-
related industries. Already in 2000 Zoboli, Barbiroli and Leone listed the following ten 
innovative developments: i) creation of special technical competences in car manufacturing 
companies; ii) creation of dismantling and recovery/recycling networks (contracted by car 
companies) with incremental innovation; iii) advances in design for dismantling; iv) advances 
in design for recycling; v) adoption of life-cycle strategies; vi) material regime simplification 
in cars; vii) material competition and substitution; viii) advances in automotive plastic 
recycling; ix) research and development in innovative recovery technologies for ASR 
(automobile shredding residue), the most problematic element in ELV techniques; x) 
cooperative research at the industrial level. This list shows that innovation takes place at the 
very beginning of the life cycle of cars, namely at the design and planning stage, followed by 
manufacturing as a result, and at the very end of the cycle, ELV treatment. In Europe and Asia, 
regulation or even the threat of it is strongly shaping the whole innovation process. The 
greatest difficulty is presented by targeting a higher recycling rate for ASR (which otherwise 
ends up in landfills). Japan has recently reduced the share that can go to landfills to 1%-2%, 
lower than that of the EU. This requires still more advanced techniques to recover materials 
from the ASR and to make progress with ‘detoxification’ of ASRs; also, more exhaustive 
dismantling (which might be costly) would decrease the recycling costs of ASR. On the other 
hand, ASRs also contain rare earth compounds like dysprosium, as well as materials (copper, 
palladium) whose price is expected to rise significantly before 2030, which amounts to a 
powerful incentive to develop new technologies. Moreover, electric vehicles, ideally, should 
not have permanent magnets.  
Altogether, ELV regulatory regimes are a powerful stimulant of innovation, beyond what 
market incentives combined with environmental rules may achieve. Innovation has taken 
place and is still vigorously undertaken both at the very beginning of the life cycle of a car and 
at the very end of ELV treatment, and these processes also influence one another directly and 
via regulatory specifications.  
3.5.4 Case study: How EU chemicals regulation hinders innovation21 
One of the objectives of the REACH Regulation 1907/2006 was to promote innovation in the 
EU chemical industry, a world leader in fine chemicals. Unlike bulk chemicals, 
competitiveness in fine chemicals depends on strong and sustained innovation capacity 
throughout the chemical value chain, especially for ‘integrators’ and ‘formulators’, but also for 
entirely new chemical substances by (usually) the large chemical companies upstream. 
REACH has been introduced for several reasons related to better risk management, but 
equally because the post-1981 regulatory environment of chemicals generated an anti-
innovation bias. One among several reasons for this bias consisted of the burden of proof 
assigned to member state authorities when assessing a new chemical substance and allowing 
it on the market, whereas 30,000 existing chemical substances (registered in or before 1981) 
were allowed on the market without testing (subject to exceptions for known hazardous 
substances, and safeguards).  
However, at first sight, the design of REACH does not seem a priori to be pro-innovation. 
Essentially, this is due to two features. One is the imposition of fairly heavy testing 
                                                   
21 This case is based on the following sources: Eurostat (2012); CSES (2012); European Commission 
(2013); Pelkmans et al. (2013); and RPA (2012).  
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requirements for all existing and new substances alike. While this removes the discrimination 
against new substances from before REACH’s implementation, it brings with it an enormous 
burden for existing substances, irrespective of risk, a cost to be entirely borne by producers. It 
would have been rational, and in keeping with ‘better regulation’ principles, if testing 
requirements had been risk-based. One way to do this is by ranking groups of substances by 
degree of risk, as known from the literature, or by testing or according to experience over a 
long period. Direct testing costs and the indirect costs of substitution of risky substances by 
other – possibly new – ones would only pertain to the relatively limited groups of substances 
where there is uncertainty about risks.  
The other feature of REACH, owing to its ambitious precautionary approach of ‘no data, no 
market’ (access), is that this entire process of testing before being allowed on the market takes 
no less than 11 years. Most laboratory capacity in Europe is bound to be occupied by the 
massive testing required, which reduces the capacity to test really new substances arising from 
innovation.  
In 2014 several interim reports of REACH are available and they confirm these fears. R&D 
expenditure has shifted away from planned projects and towards technical compliance 
activities; compliance costs for SMEs divert resources that cannot be spent on any R&D; extra 
costs reduce profits considerably in some cases; and much uncertainty throttles new product 
initiatives. The incentive structure under REACH is adverse for companies, since the costs of 
testing, finding substitutes and value-chain compliance are all upfront for as many as 11 years, 
whereas the societal benefits are most uncertain and not expected to be realised until after 2018 
or much later still. There is also the risk of losing competitiveness vis-à-vis competitors in the 
rest of the world, except if, and to the extent that, third countries would adopt a REACH-like 
approach (which is only slightly the case for Korea and possibly partially for China).  
3.5.5 Case study: EU biotech regulation as a penalty on innovation22 
Two of the core principles of ‘better regulation’ are that regulation should be science- and 
evidence-based, and that risks – not hazard properties – of a substance or good should be the 
focus of health, safety and environmental benefits for society. Hazard-based approaches 
therefore lead to overregulation, possibly heavily so. In turn, risks should be established by 
globally respected, rigorous science- and evidence-based risk assessment methods. Since 
‘better regulation’ principles are increasingly accepted as rational and least-cost in the EU by 
all stakeholders, those advancing political conjectures or echoing consumer aversion have 
embraced the ‘precautionary principle’ as the respectable route to restricting or prohibiting 
new products or initiatives, even when little or no hard scientific evidence is available.  
This is the predicament of two submarkets of biotechnology in Europe, namely for genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) and for crop protection. GMOs have significant and proven 
societal benefits. Worldwide, many millions of farmers experience greater certainty and less 
poverty due to GMOs’ capacity to protect their harvests. This is certainly true in large 
quantities for developing countries’ farmers growing cotton (80%) and soybeans (70%). Given 
the reality of reduced land, water and fertiliser resources, it is essential that more food be 
produced sustainably worldwide. In EU regulation as well as in debates in the two bodies co-
legislating the rules, these formidable benefits seem to play no role. The upshot in the EU is 
that only two new GMO products have been allowed to be cultivated: NK603 GM maize and 
the Amflora potato. In 2012, after having waited for more than 13 years, BASF gave up on 
                                                   
22 This case is based on the following sources: European Academies Science Advisory Council (2013); 
European Commission (2009); Cantley and Lex (2011); Alemanno (2013).  
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Amflora and transferred that activity to the US. The maize is cultivated practically only in 
Spain; no other EU country accepts it and NGOs discredit the cultivation or the company 
behind it. As a result, the EU has hardly been able to innovate in this area, a growth sector in 
the rest of the world. From a regulatory point of view, the restrictiveness of GMO regulation 
brings no benefit to European society whilst damaging the biotech industry, even though there 
is no scientific empirical evidence of any risk. The state of denial is so bad in the EU that no 
fewer than 23 national academies of science in the EU felt compelled to write a report 
(“Planting the future”) in June 2013, stressing that there is nothing in the scholarly literature 
to justify suspicions that GMOs thus far allowed in non-EU OECD countries are a risk to 
society.  
The EU biotech industry is not dead, far from it; it is doing well to avoid specialisation in GMO 
or other crop-protection products. But even that is not without dangers. Recently, a very 
controversial decision to temporarily ban a (much used) neonicotinoids pesticide because of a 
suspected connection to the decline of Europe’s bee population – again, under the 
precautionary principle – although several other reasons are at least as likely to have caused 
this decline, show that science-based risk assessment was bypassed, damaging the prospects 
for a relatively new and successful product, and perhaps discouraging the industry from 
pursuing others. 
4. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
This short paper has shown that the interaction between regulation and innovation is complex, 
multifaceted, and often ambiguous, such that assessing the impact of a given piece of 
regulation on innovation is often an empirical, case-by-case exercise. That said, our analysis 
has shed light, with the help of pre-existing literature, on the types of regulation that affect 
innovation, and the way in which different types of regulation can affect innovation. More 
specifically, our main findings imply that: 
 Regulation can, under certain circumstances, be a powerful stimulus of innovation 
and entrepreneurship, but at times regulation can and does disable innovation. The 
ultimate impact of regulation on innovation is an empirical, case-by-case question, and 
depends on the balance between innovation-inducing factors and compliance costs 
generated by regulation.  
 EU regulation matters at all stages of the innovation process, from R&D to 
commercialisation.  
 Different types of regulation can be identified, in terms of their impact on innovation. 
We distinguish between general rules, innovation-specific rules, and sector-specific 
legislation. General regulation affects the general business environment, creating 
compliance and administrative burdens, reducing transaction costs, affecting ‘exit 
strategies’, e.g. bankruptcy laws, and more generally affecting the risk associated with 
innovation. Innovation-specific rules directly affect incentives to innovate, normally 
reducing the cost of innovation. Sector-specific regulation directly affects innovation in a 
way that depends mostly on the stringency, timing, flexibility and uncertainty generated 
by the rules at hand. 
 Different types of regulatory approach can have different impacts on innovation. 
Typically, more prescriptive, rigid regulation can hamper innovative activity by 
reducing the attractiveness of engaging in R&D, constraining modes of 
commercialisation, and creating lock-in effects that force the economy into suboptimal 
standards. The more regulation is flexible, such as in co-regulatory settings (and subject 
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to competition law constraints), or in the use of performance-based or outcome-based 
standards, the more innovation can be stimulated. In addition, during the enforcement 
phase of regulation, the lower the costs of compliance and the administrative burdens, 
the more positive is the impact on innovation.  
 The EU acquis demonstrates both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ examples. Our case studies 
span from the early adoption of standards that largely stimulated innovation, e.g. the 
GSM, to cases of overly excessive regulatory burdens, e.g. chemicals. This suggests that, 
in the revision of the acquis in various sectors (especially within the current REFIT 
programme), there are likely to be ample opportunities for stimulating innovation by 
identifying possibilities to reduce regulatory burdens and improve the stimulus effect of 
legal rules.  
In light of the above, we recommend the following: 
 Impacts on innovation should be put at the core of the EU impact assessment 
methodology. The current review of the guidelines (now under consultation) will be a 
valuable opportunity to strengthen the analysis of the balance between innovation-
enhancing and innovation-constraining effects of the various alternative policy options 
scrutinised in each impact assessment. Key criteria to be included in the analysis would 
then be the timing, stringency, flexibility and certainty effects of alternative policy 
options: they could be translated into a checklist to ease the work of the desk officer in 
charge of impact assessment. The checklist could also refer to alternative types of policy 
intervention, which typically create different policy concerns (see section 1.2.1).  
 A specific ‘innovation test’ for smaller firms could be included in the impact 
assessment guidelines, possibly within the context of the ‘SME test’. This is important 
as smaller firms are typically the most dynamic actors in the innovation ecosystem (see 
Annex 1).  
 Ex-post evaluation of individual pieces of EU legislation should entail an analysis of 
the impact on innovation. Currently, the European Commission is in the process of 
defining guidelines for ex post evaluation (a consultation was run in the first months of 
2014). The new version of the guidelines could incorporate an analysis of the timing, 
stringency, flexibility and certainty effects of existing rules, in order to identify potential 
improvements.  
 Similarly, the impact of the stock of regulation on innovation should be a major part 
of the REFIT exercise currently being carried out in various sectors. The same could be 
said for the cumulative cost assessments being performed in specific fields (steel, 
aluminium, ceramics, forest-based industries) by DG Enterprise.  
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